Applying the Resilient Node Cluster Analysis Tool (ReNCAT) to site Microgrids in Puerto Rico for Community Resilience

PRESENTED BY

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May 16, 2019

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Analysis Goal

Identify potential microgrid locations that increase resilience of the community

Explore portfolios of these microgrids that cost-effectively meet resilience goals

Infrastructure Sector Data

Existing Grid Layout

Microgrid Equipment Costs

Population Characteristics

Potential Microgrid Locations

Microgrid Portfolio Resilience Impacts

- Service Level
- Infrastructure Service Community Burden
- Cost



Sandia Analysis Process

1 Infrastructure Data and Threat Analysis



2 Determine Locations Providing High Service Levels

Tool: ReNCAT



3 Examine Candidate Microgrid Locations



4 Finalize Candidate Microgrid Locations

5 Cost/Benefit Tradeoff Analysis



6 Visualize Metrics and Resilience Options

Tool: MPEx

Step 1
Infrastructure Data and Threat Analysis

Threat Characterization

Overview of Threats, Data Sources, and Relative Probabilities

Hazard	Source	Threat Profile Used	50-yr Probability of Exceedance	Link
Flooding	FEMA FIRM	100-yr and 500-yr (return period)	39% (100-yr) 9.5% (500-yr)	www.fema.gov/flood-mapping-products
Wind	ASCE	100-yr and 700-yr (return period)	39% (100-yr) 6.9% (700-yr)	windspeed.atcouncil.org/
Landslide	USGS	Susceptibility: highest, high, moderate, low	N/A	pr.water.usgs.gov/public/online_pubs/mism_i_1148/index.html
Earthquake	USGS	Structure Damage: Moderate, Light	2%	earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/hazmaps/islands.php#prvi

Threat Characterization - Earthquake

Southwest corner of island plus a very small area near Rincón exceed moderate damage at 2% probability over 50 years

earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/hazmaps/islands.php#prvi

Threat Characterization - Landslide

Northern Cordillera ridge has high susceptibility. Small pockets of very high susceptibility throughout. Many smaller towns entirely within the moderate susceptibility zone.



pr.water.usgs.gov/public/online_pubs/mism_i_1148/index.html

Threat Characterization - Flood

Large sections of San Juan, Ponce, Mayaguez, Cabo Rojo, Caguas, and several other towns within the 100-yr flood zone. Often (not always) the critical infrastructure is outside this zone.

Threat Characterization - Wind

Slight gradient from southeast to northwest, peak gust wind speeds on flat open terrain



windspeed.atcouncil.org/

Analysis Scope

Aggregation of analysis results by PREPA planning region



Critical Infrastructure



- Focus on the services provided to people
- Included 42 critical infrastructure types (6,643 individual points) and 15 service types

Critical Infrastructure



Step 2
Determine Locations Providing High Service Levels

Services, Not Sectors

- Infrastructure types mapped to one or more service types
- Different sectors can provide the same service at various contribution levels
- Concerned with identifying resilient nodes within that provide high levels across the different service types

Community Service	Level of Contribution by Infrastructure Sector		
	High	Medium	Low
Communications	Cell Towers; Wire Centers; Internet		Microwave Transmitters
Emergency Logistics	Local Emergency Operations Center; PEP	AM Radio Station Transmitters; FM Radio Station Transmitters	Evacuation Sites ; Points of Distribution; Official Shelters; Unofficial Shelters; Wire Centers; Cell Towers
Evacuation	Evacuation Sites; PEP; Airports	Wire Centers; Rail Stations; Bus Main Stations; Cruise Terminals	Police Stations; Local Emergency Operations Center; Cell Towers; Rail Operations and Maintenance; Bus Garages; Ferry Terminals
Finance	Bank Mains	Bank Branches	Wire Centers
Food	Points of Distribution; Large Grocery Stores; Airports	Small Grocery Stores	Official Shelters; Unofficial Shelters; Hotels; Gas Stations; Pharmacies; Cruise Terminals
Fuel	Gas Stations; Fuel Storage		
Medical Services	Hospitals; EMS	Air Ambulances; Medical Centers	Fire Stations; Pharmacies
Medications	Pharmacies	Hospitals	Points of Distribution; Official Shelters; Unofficial Shelters; Gas Stations; Large Grocery Stores; Medical Centers
Restoration	Electric Utility Control Center; Electric Utility Equipment Yard	Airports	Fuel Storage
Safety	Fire Stations; PSAP	EMS	Wire Centers; Cell Towers
Security	Police Stations; PSAP		Wire Centers; Cell Towers
Shelter	Official Shelters; Hotels	Unofficial Shelters	
Transportation	Rail Stations; Bus Main Stations; Airports	Rail Operations and Maintenance; Bus Garages; Ferry Terminals	Cruise Terminals
Waste Management	Sewer Treatment Plants	Sewer Pumps	Official Shelters; Unofficial Shelters
Water	POD; Water Main Office and Repair Yard	Large Grocery Stores; Water Purification; Water Pumps; Water Storage Tanks	Official Shelters; Unofficial Shelters; Hotels; Gas Stations; Small Grocery Stores; Pharmacies; Airports; Cruise Terminals

Infrastructure Exclusion Profiles

Balancing act: suggested areas for microgrids should be outside of, but close to heavily damaged areas in order to serve displaced/vulnerable populations

Initially, suggested microgrid areas exclude infrastructure based on the following exclusion profiles (some exceptions noted later)

Most analysis performed using Risk Averse and Risk Accepting profiles

Exclusion Profile	Wind Exclusions	Flood Exclusions	Earthquake Exclusions	Landslide Exclusions
Risk Averse	-	In 500 yr zone	Medium and higher damage zones	Medium and higher susceptibility zones
Risk Accepting	-	In 100 yr zone	High and higher damage zones	High and higher susceptibility zones
100 yr Flood	-	In 100 yr zone	-	-
500 yr Flood	-	In 500 yr zone	-	-
Landslide Med	-	-	-	Medium and higher susceptibility zones
Landslide High	-	-	-	High and higher susceptibility zones
Earthquake Med	-	-	Medium and higher damage zones	-

Infrastructure Availability



Excluding assets with medium landslide susceptibility represents the primary difference between Risk Averse and Risk Accepting

Microgrid Siting Analysis

This project utilized Sandia's ReNCAT tool to identify locations that have high levels of services available based on the threat constraints.



ReNCAT Tool Suggests Locations with High Service Levels



Effect of Grid Size on ReNCAT Results



Threat Exclusion Profiles Show Different Results

100-yr Flood



Landslide Med





These ReNCAT runs used 1000x1000ft grid cell and minimum service score of 30

Step 3
Examine Candidate Microgrid Locations

ReNCAT to Microgrids: Ponce Example

Explore the green squares – find high concentration of services outside the hazard zones



ReNCAT to Microgrids: Ponce Example

- Find clusters of assets – ideally all on the same feeder - and minimize non-critical load
- Draw microgrid polygon to balance use of isolation switches vs. acceptance of non-critical load



Distribution feeders: PREPA

Step 4
Finalize Candidate Microgrid Locations

Microgrids Identified by Planning Region



- 159 locations in total
- 1,128 of 6,643 (17%) infrastructure points are within an identified microgrid



A broad set of services provided by microgrids

The less represented services (waste, grid restoration, transportation) tend to be served by fewer assets

Service Scores for All Microgrids by Planning Region



Step 5
Cost Benefit Tradeoff Analysis

Baseline Resilience

Goal is to:

- Assess microgrid impact resilience
- Choose optimal portfolio of all the potential options

Map of Total Burden to Acquire All Services in the Baseline Scenario (No Microgrids Built)



Effort
Average distance traveled to acquire service

Ability
Median household income for census block group

→ **Burden**

Assumptions

- City-wide blackout
- No infrastructure considered as reliable backup power

Portfolio Evaluation

"Do nothing" scenario



All Microgrids

A large decrease in burden can be achieved for relatively low cost compared to all microgrids

Backup Slides

Microgrid **assessment** and analysis steps following selection of microgrid sites for further design

Initial Assessment

Characterize System and Define Boundaries

The system to which resilience solutions will be applied

Identify Critical Loads and Infrastructure

The critical functions that performance must be improved for

Define Design Basis Threats (DBTs)

Natural and man made threats and power outage durations that performance goals must be designed to address

Define Performance Goals and Objectives

How system must function to withstand DBT including boundary of critical assets protected, duration of protection, and critical mission energy needs and operations

Additional Assumptions

- Assuming no existing reliable backup power
  - Can be revisited if backup generators are known
- Assuming non-power infrastructure is robust to high winds
  - Should be revisited for some infrastructures, e.g. cell towers
- Resilience improvements primarily focus on using microgrids
  - Analysis can suggest locations for localized backup and energy storage
  - E.g. not a feeder hardening study

What is a Microgrid?



Microgrid Attributes

- Can be sized at full substation, feeder, partial feeder or customer level
- Can operate islanded or grid-tied
- Can integrate distributed and renewable generation, CCHP and manage and control power demand and distributed resource allocation

Blue sky benefits depend on how microgrid can provide revenue streams such as by providing on-going PV and energy storage services to the grid, leveraging CCHP, and providing distribution services such as demand response for peak periods, voltage and Var support, arbitrage, black start, etc.

Microgrid Cost

Generation Requirement

- Load estimates for buildings (in terms of kW demand per square footage) using 2012 EIA CBECS building activity
  - Adjusted for climate region
- Open EI building model
- AM & FM transmitters, cell and microgrid towers calculated differently
- Critical and non-critical demand quantified separately

Energy use and peak demand of each building in a microgrid area

Cost Estimation

- Average costs for generation (diesel, PV), points of common coupling, switches, overhead/underground lines
- Every microgrid has same equipment costs – this will be refined as selections are made
  - Four equipment options are considered to give a range, but are applied uniformly across all microgrids

Cost estimate of each microgrid (four cost scenarios for equipment utilization)



Microgrids with *at least* one asset within an exclusion zone

ReNCAT Results

Risk Averse



Risk Accepting



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

Low Landslide



500-yr Flood



100-yr Flood



Risk Averse



Low Earthquake



Low & Mod Landslide